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"ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL' '
THE POLITICS OF MERIT-BASED FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson had been in Paris during the Convention,
serving as minister to France. When he returned, he asked
George Washington over breakfast why the President had agreed
to a two-house Congress.... Washington replied with his own
question: "Why did you pour your tea into that saucer?" And
when Jefferson answered, "To cool it," Washington said, "Just
so. We pour House legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool
it.",
The United States Senate's responsibility to act as a "cooling saucer"
in its consideration of national issues does not apply solely to its role in
the lawmaking process. Historically considered the more deliberative of
the two houses of Congress, the Senate is also charged with the
constitutional duty of giving the President "advice and consent" on
major presidential appointments, including members of the federal
judiciary.3
However, despite its reputation for cool-headed, fair-minded
deliberation, in modern times, the Senate's consideration of judicial
nominees has been anything but dispassionate or consistent. From
staging a thirty-hour "talk-a-thon" on the Senate floor to draw attention
to four filibustered judicial nominees while putting arguably more
important spending legislation on hold,4 to hurling accusations of "anti-
1. The late Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill coined this phrase, which is a constant
reminder that national issues-even federal judicial nominations-both shape and are shaped
by political considerations at the local level. See generally TIP O'NEILL & GARY HYMEL,
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME XV (1994).
2. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 9
(2002).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. Helen Dewar & Fred Barbash, Talkathon Continues Today, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,
2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comac2/wp-dyn/A35182-2003Nov13. While
Senate Republicans such as Majority Leader Bill Frist believed the talk-a-thon to be "an
historic justice-for-justice marathon to confirm the President's judicial nominees and highlight
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Catholic bias" at their colleagues who opposed certain pro-life
nominees,5 Senators on both sides of the aisle have allowed political
considerations and partisan debate to overshadow the goal of selecting a
highly qualified and independent judiciary.6 This strife surrounding
judicial nominees further intensified in 2004 with President George W.
Bush's use of his recess appointment power7 twice in five weeks to
the Democrats' partisan obstructionism," Minority Leader Tom Daschle, echoing the
sentiments of most Senate Democrats, dismissed the stunt as "a colossal waste of time." Id.
5. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Appeals Court Nominee Again Blocked: Senate Action Renews
Angry Exchanges Over Charges of Anti-Catholic Bias, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at A2.
Later, Senator Rick Santorum denounced the opposition of Democrats and some moderate
Republicans to the district court nomination of J. Leon Holmes as "religious bigotry." Sarita
Chourey, Santorum Denounces "Bigotry," THE HILL, Oct. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.hillnews.com/ news/100203/santorum.aspx. According to The Hill newspaper,
"Holmes, a lawyer and the former president of Arkansas Right to Life, wrote that the duty of
the wife is 'to subordinate herself to her husband.' Also, he has compared abortion to slavery
and maintains that rape victims seldom become pregnant." Id.
6. In one prominent recent example, the Miguel Estrada nomination to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was particularly contentious and
ended with Estrada withdrawing his name after a two-year filibuster. This nomination was
surrounded by a cloud of ugly racial politics from both sides of the aisle. In a March 2003
editorial, The Washington Post chided both parties for using the Estrada nomination as an
issue to mobilize their political bases:
Mr. Estrada's opponents demeaningly complain that he was nominated because of
his Hispanic ethnicity, as though he were not an accomplished lawyer who would be
qualified for the bench irrespective of his country of origin. Some Hispanic advocacy
groups add the offensive complaint that Mr. Estrada is not Hispanic enough-a code
for the conservative Mr. Estrada's not sharing their politics. Mr. Estrada's
supporters, meanwhile, openly accuse the Democrats who oppose him of being anti-
Hispanic, as though anyone could seriously believe that their opposition results from
bigotry. And the White House ... openly crows about having nominated the first
Hispanic to the D.C. Circuit. How did all sides of this debate come to accept that the
courts are part of some grand ethnic spoils system-that Mr. Estrada should be
confirmed or rejected depending on what sort of Hispanic he is, rather than what
sort of lawyer he is?
Editorial, Layers of Nonsense, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at A18. Moreover, the use of
judicial nominations for political gain is, at best, a questionable strategy because of the
public's relatively sparse knowledge of the issues involved in judicial selection. According to
The Washington Post, "Republican pollsters, trying to determine whether the Estrada
standoff was hurting Democrats with Hispanic voters, found that many respondents thought
the questions concerned the 'CHiPs' actor Erik Estrada." Mike Allen, GOP Plans
'Marathon' on Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2003, at Al. Thus, Senators may expend a great
deal of political capital on opposing or supporting a particular nominee, only to gain little in
terms of voter support in return.
7. The Constitution authorizes the President to make appointments without Senate
approval to fill any vacancy during a congressional recess. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
Unlike other federal judicial appointments, recess appointments are not permanent; they
expire at the end of the congressional session in which they are granted. Id.
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install controversial nominees Charles Pickering and William Pryor to
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits respectively, bypassing Senate approval
over the objections of the majority of Democratic Senators.
In September 2003, in the midst of this politically charged debate,
the Republican White House, with the blessing of Wisconsin's two
Democratic Senators, announced the nomination of a conservative
judge to fill a vacancy of a Wisconsin seat on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 9 Hailed by the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel as "a rare bipartisan decision,"' the nomination of Wisconsin
Supreme Court Justice Diane Sykes to the Seventh Circuit seemed to
embrace a spirit of cooperation and contemplation consistent with the
"senatorial cooling saucer" deliberative ideal, "in contrast to others that
foundered in a fierce partisan storm."n
Justice Sykes was one of four names recommended to the White
House by the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission, a merit
selection panel that, through screening, interviewing, and
recommending applicants for the Seventh Circuit vacancy, played a
large role in the seemingly bipartisan nature of the Sykes nomination.12
On the surface, it seemed as if Wisconsin's United States Senators Herb
Kohl and Russ Feingold, through the use of this local bipartisan merit
selection committee, had found a way to sidestep the partisan perils of
8. Mike Allen, Bush Again Bypasses Senate to Seat Judge, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at
Al; John King, Pickering Appointment Angers Democrats, CNN.com, Jan. 17, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/17lbush.pickering/index.html. The battle over
Pickering, a United States District Court judge from Mississippi nominated to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, had waged for two years before his recess appointment. Id.
Democrats, concerned with Pickering's past stances on racial issues, had first blocked his
nomination in Committee, and then, upon Pickering's renomination, filibustered the
nomination on the Senate floor, despite Bush's belief that Pickering would have been
confirmed on an up-or-down vote. Id. Similarly, Senate Democrats had invoked the
filibuster against Alabama Attorney General William Pryor, whose comments on abortion
and homosexuals during his confirmation hearing led many Democrats to believe that his
views were outside the mainstream. Allen, supra. In an editorial, The Washington Post called
the Pickering recess appointment "another unwarranted escalation of the judicial nomination
wars." Editorial, End Run for Mr. Pickering, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2004, at A24. Likewise,
the Post characterized the Pryor appointment as "more provocation" by the Bush
Administration. Editorial, More Provocation, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A18.
9. Steven Walters, Justice Sykes to Be Bush's Pick for U.S. Appeals Court, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 24,2003, at 1A.
10. Gregory Stanford, Editorial, A Rare Bipartisan Decision, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Sept.
25, 2003, at 28A.
11. Id.
12. David Callender, Sykes is 7th Circuit Finalist, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug.
5, 2003, at A3.
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the national nomination process that had plagued so many of their
Senate colleagues in recent years.
In fact, the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission has existed
in some form since its inception in 1979."3 Created to assist Wisconsin
Senators in the advice and consent process by assessing and
recommending qualified individuals to fill open seats on the Wisconsin
federal bench, the Federal Nominating Commission was also established
to aid in the elevation of minorities and women to the federal judiciary."
Additionally, Wisconsin elected officials prominently tout the
Commission's role in "depoliticiz[ing]" judicial selection, avoiding the
public disputes that have characterized the process recently.15 However,
over the past twenty-five years, the results of the Commission's attempt
to achieve a system of federal judicial selection focusing on merit,
independence, diversity, and nonpartisanship have been mixed.
This Comment will trace the development of the Wisconsin Federal
Nominating Commission and assess its role in the federal judicial
selection process since its inception in 1979. Part II will briefly discuss
the Commission's origins and history. Part III will discuss the
contention that the Commission depoliticizes the selection process,
citing specific examples where political considerations played a large
role in the process despite the use of the Commission. Part IV will
contend that the federal judicial nomination process most likely will
always be political to some degree and will conclude that, although its
record over the years has been mixed, the Federal Nominating
Commission indeed plays a beneficial role in Wisconsin legal and
political life by restoring civility to the selection process and legitimacy
to the federal bench.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL NOMINATING COMMISSION:
A BRIEF HISTORY
The Federal Nominating Commission has played a role in almost all
of the federal judicial appointments to Wisconsin seats since Senators
William Proxmire and Gaylord Nelson, both Democrats, instituted the
first version of the Commission in 1979.16 Senators Proxmire and Nelson
13. John W. Kole, Selection Panels Near, MILw. J., Feb. 4, 1979, Accent, at 1.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Herb Kohl, U.S. Senate Confirms William
Griesbach as New Federal Judge in Green Bay Today (Apr. 25, 2002) (on file at
http://www.senate.gov/-koh/press/02/04/2003523338.html).
16. Press Release, Office of Sen. Russell Feingold, Kohl, Feingold, and Sensenbrenner
1034 [88:1031
2005] FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION IN WISCONSIN
established the Commission in response to an Executive Order issued by
President Jimmy Carter in 197817 encouraging Senators to establish local
merit-based commissions to select federal district court judges whenever
vacancies occurred in their home states."8
President Carter, who had utilized similar merit panels to select
judges as Governor of Georgia,19 first instituted national selection
commissions for the United States circuit courts of appeals four weeks
after being sworn into office.2" The district court merit selection panels,
modeled after these national circuit court commissions, were to be
instituted on a voluntary basis by senators from each state, and were to
encourage selection of judges based not on political patronage, but
instead on merit.21 In 1978, Carter signed legislation that expanded the
federal judiciary by roughly thirty percent. 22 As he promised in his
presidential campaign, Carter attempted to use the commissions to fill
these seats "strictly on the basis of merit, without any consideration of
political aspects or influence., 23 Carter hoped that localized merit-based
selection, coupled with an active consideration of race and gender in the
selection process, would lead to a more independent, representative,
and highly qualified judiciary than the past products of political
24patronage.
Although not every state's Senate delegation responded to the
Carter Administration's call for reform of the district court judicial
selection process,2- Wisconsin's Senators created a commission that
endured and evolved to become a distinctive part of Wisconsin's legal
history. The Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission survived even
after President Carter left office and President Ronald Reagan
Announce Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission (July 23, 2001) (on file at
http://feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/01/07/2001723B20.html).
17. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,455 (Nov. 8, 1978).
18. Frank A. Aukofer, Panel Created to Screen U.S. Judicial Candidates, MILW. J., Feb.
12, 1979, Accent, at 10.
19. Griffin B. Bell, The Carter Years, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND
POLITICS 26 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest ed., 1990).
20. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 42 Fed. Reg. 9659 (Feb. 14, 1977). For a history and critique
of the Carter-era circuit court nominating commissions, see LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B.
CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS,
PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980).
21. Bell, supra note 19, at 26.
22. Jim Mann, Court Test. Despite Efforts by Carter, Selection of Judges Still Political,
MILW. J., Feb. 25, 1979, pt. 9, at 1.
23. Id.
24. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES, 238-39 (1997).
25. Bell, supra note 19, at 27.
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disbanded the circuit court commission reform scheme, consciously
shifting the emphasis away from merit and toward ideology.26 The
modern version of the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission is a
remnant of the Carter-era federal judicial selection reforms, working
toward achieving the same ideals of merit and diversity on the federal
bench that President Carter championed.27
Today, Wisconsin's Senators activate the Federal Nominating
Commission, a panel composed of ten legal experts and chaired by one
or both of the Deans of Marquette and Wisconsin Law Schools,
whenever a vacancy on the federal bench in Wisconsin occurs. 8  The
Commission screens the applicants for a judgeship or U.S. Attorney
position, narrowing the list of potential names from which the White
House will choose its nominee.29  This screening process consists of
notifying the public of the vacancy, collecting applications from all
interested candidates, interviewing selected applicants, and generating a
list of four to six qualified individuals, which the Commission submits to
the two Senators. ° The Senators may elect to strike one or more of the
names from the list and, after approving the final list, forward the names
to the President of the United States for consideration.'
26. GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 290-91. Since Carter left office, the Federal
Nominating Commission has been used for every Wisconsin federal court vacancy, with the
exception of the 1981 nomination of John L. Coffey to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Part III, infra.
27. See generally Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, §§ I(b), 111(a)
(1995), at http://www.wisbar.org/newscenter/feature/2001/1218a.html.
28. Id. §§ IV(d)(i)-(iii). When the vacancy in question is in the Western District of
Wisconsin, the Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School (or his or her designee) will
chair the Commission; when the vacancy is in the Eastern District, the Dean of Marquette
Law School (or his or her designee) will be chair. Id. When the vacancy is on the Seventh
Circuit, the chair position alternates between the Deans. Id. However, when the
Commission was activated in 2003 for the most recent Seventh Circuit vacancy, the Deans
served as cochairs of the Commission.
29. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, § III. Although
the Commission is activated to fill U.S. Attorney positions as well, this Comment will address
the role of the panel only as it pertains to judicial nominations.
30. Id. §§ II, III, VII, VIII.
31. Id. The Commission process does not ensure that the senators--even when they are
of the same political party-will agree on the final list of names to submit to the President,
however. According to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "[f]ederal judicial appointments have
been a rare source of public disagreement between [Democratic Senators] Kohl and Feingold.
In 1994, Kohl recommended that Clinton appoint [U.S. District Judge Terence] Evans to the
7th Circuit, while Feingold forwarded to Clinton the names of all six finalists recommended
by the nominating commission. Earlier, the two Senators differed on who should become the
U.S. attorneys in Milwaukee and Madison." Marilynn Marchione, List for U.S. Bench Cut to
Five Finalists, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1A. As a matter of Senate procedure, the
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The Senators' activation of the Federal Nominating Commission, as
well as the President's cooperation with this judicial selection scheme, is
wholly voluntary. The Commission has always operated solely by
tradition, and neither the Senators nor the President are bound to follow
the procedures outlined in the Wisconsin Federal Nominating
Commission Charter.32 In fact, the Charter is the only written set of
guidelines governing the process, as the Commission "exist[s] not by
statute but by agreement of the political actors involved."33
All Commission proceedings are closed to the public,34 and the final
list of recommendations is the only written statement that the
Commission must release.35 The Federal Nominating Commission
Charter requires that all other proceedings, applications, or information
submitted to the Commission remain confidential.36 All voting is
performed by secret ballot. 7
The political makeup of Wisconsin's federal congressional
delegation, as well as which party controls the White House, determines
who sits on the Federal Nominating Commission and presumably
influences its ideological leanings. Often the Federal Nominating
Commission is bipartisan, consisting of members chosen by elected
officials of both political parties. For instance, under the current
Charter, when, as in 2003, the President is of a different political party
than both Senators, each Senator appoints two members of the
Commission, the Wisconsin State Bar appoints two, and the most senior
elected member of the President's party appoints four.38 If only one
Senator belongs to the same party as the President, that Senator will
appoint five members, the other Senator will appoint three, and the
ability of either of the home-state Senators to express disapproval of, and effectively
eliminate, a potential federal nominee is not in itself novel. Under the Senate's "blue-slip"
tradition, the failure of either home-state Senator to return a favorable "blue slip" (a paper
expressing approval of the nominee) will effectively block the nominee from consideration in
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., Associated Press, GOP Move Would Help
Nominees, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2003, at A25. This practice has come under fire in recent
years from Republican leaders who wish to expedite the confirmation process. Id.
32. Craig Gilbert, Tussle Likely in Filling Judgeship, MILW. J. SENTINEL, June 4, 2003, at
lB.
33. Id.
34. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, § X.
35. Id. § VIII
36. Id. § X.
37. Id. § IX(c).
38. Id. § IV(d). 2001 was the first year in the history of the Commission that neither
Senator was of the same political party as the President. Gretchen Schuldt, Panel Set to
Review Federal Appointees, MILW. J. SENTINEL, July 24, 2001, at 2B.
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State Bar of Wisconsin will appoint two.39
The Federal Nominating Commission is not always bipartisan,
however. If both Senators and the President are from the same political
party, each Senator appoints four members, while the State Bar of
Wisconsin appoints two.4" The Federal Nominating Commission has
consisted of members selected solely by elected officials of the same
party in its consideration of five nominees: Barbara Crabb, Terence
Evans (twice)," Charles Clevert, and Lynn Adelman were all
recommended by a Commission chosen without Republican
participation.42
Regardless of the party identification of the elected officials making
the appointments, the officials are responsible for appointing
Commission members who "shall each be residents of the State of
Wisconsin, reflecting the diversity of the population and the respective
judicial districts of the state."43 Members serve for two-year terms.4
The purposes outlined in the Federal Nominating Commission's
Charter are similar to the goals that the Carter Administration
articulated when it first established merit-based commissions to ensure
that merit and integrity-and not political spoils-would be the main
considerations in the federal judicial selection process.45 According to
the Federal Nominating Commission Charter, the official purposes of
the Commission are to:
(a) assist the United States Senators from Wisconsin in
faithfully fulfilling their constitutional and statutory
obligation to provide advice and consent to the
President in appointing federal judges and U.S.
Attorneys;
39. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, § IV(c).
40. Id. § IV(b).
41. Judge Evans went through the Commission process twice--once in 1979 when
President Carter appointed him to serve on the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and once in
1995 when President Clinton elevated him to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Nominations of Michael R. Murphy & Terence T. Evans, to Be U.S. Circuit Judges; James M.
Moody, William K. Sessions III, & Ortrie D. Smith, to Be U.S. District Judges; and Donald C.
Pogue, to Be a Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 263-93 (1995).
42. In the years 1979, 1996, and 1997, a Democrat occupied the White House and
Wisconsin had two Democratic Senators. See generally Federal Judicial Center, at
www.fjc.gov.
43. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, § IV(a).
44. Id.
45. Bell, supra note 19, at 27.
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(b) help insure that qualified, conscientious and dedicated
individuals be appointed to serve the public as judicial
officers; and
(c) protect and preserve the independence and integrity
of the judicial branch of government and help insure
the fair and equal administration and enforcement of
justice under the laws of the United States.'
The current Charter also addresses the initial Carter Administration
concerns with enhancing diversity on the federal bench and reducing the
instances of political patronage in the selection process. 7 In addition to
working to fulfill the basic purposes outlined above, the Commission is
charged with the following responsibilities:
(a) [to] affirmatively seek out qualified candidates, including
women and minority candidates, for appointment to each
such vacancy;
(b) [to] consider all applications from individuals interested
in appointment to each such vacancy; and
(c) [to] recommend the nomination of not less than four nor
more than six individuals who are the most qualified of
those considered to serve.
Finally, in addition to citing these goals codified in the Charter,
Wisconsin Senators often tout the unwritten goal of "depoliticizing" the
federal judicial process as an additional benefit of the Commission
process. 4' A return to the senatorial "cooling saucer" ideal, the
Commission in theory serves to defuse national political struggles over
the judiciary at the local level through a deliberative, merit-based
process before Wisconsin federal nominees reach the Senate for
consideration. ° Although the idea of a merit-based selection panel has
inspired much rhetoric about removing politics from the process, the
46. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, § I.
47. Id. § 111(a).
48. Id. § III.
49. See, e.g., Nomination of Diane S. Sykes of Wisconsin, Nominee to Be Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit; James L. Robert of Washington, Nominee to Be District Judge for the
Western District of Washington; and Juan R. Sanchez of Pennsylvania, Nominee to Be District
Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 581-84 (2004) [hereinafter Sykes Hearing] (statements of Sens. Kohl
and Feingold).
50. See generally id.
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Commission has not always performed in an apolitical manner; indeed,
the Commission process on more than one occasion has had the
unintended consequence of obscuring the actual politics of judicial
selection from the public eye.5
While the Commission's attention to merit, independence, and
diversity is indeed commendable, especially in light of the rancor and
politicization that have marked the judicial national selection process of
late, the Commission's record of implementing these ideals in the
selection process has been mixed. Specifically, the Commission process
has not always been able to remove political considerations from federal
judicial selection, although it arguably has engendered greater civility
and legitimacy in the process of selecting federal judges from Wisconsin.
III. LOCAL POLITICS AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION:
THE WISCONSIN FEDERAL NOMINATING COMMISSION'S
FAILURE TO REMOVE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
FROM THE NOMINATING PROCESS
Removing the politics from federal judicial selection and thus
attaining a truly independent, merit-based judiciary may be an
aspiration that, despite the best efforts of reformers and public officials,
will always remain an aspiration. Publicly, the Wisconsin Federal
Nominating Commission, a seemingly appropriate development in the
context of Wisconsin's proud progressive tradition, has been lauded as
upholding the senatorial "cooling saucer" ideal by serving as an
apolitical, independent mechanism to aid in a bipartisan federal judicial
selection process. 2 For instance, Wisconsin's senior Senator, Herb
Kohl, has described the Commission as "fair and independent."53 Russ
Feingold, the state's junior Senator, has stated that the Commission
"help[s] to take the judicial selection process out of politics as much as
possible."54 And just recently, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel praised
the Commission's "bipartisan approach" and the "civil manner" in
which the Diane Sykes nomination to the Seventh Circuit Court of
51. See Part III, infra.
52. See, e.g., Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, White House Plays Favorites with Judge Job,
MILW. J. SENTINEL, July 27, 2003, at 2A (describing "all the nice talk about the purity of the
commission process and Wisconsin's much-vaunted progressive tradition" regarding the
Commission's role in filling the 2003 Seventh Circuit vacancy).
53. Press Release, Office of Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl, Feingold Announce Activation of
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Appeals in 2003 was conducted.5
Ironically, instead of removing politics from the process, the
nonpartisan faqade of the Commission may actually help to overshadow,
and at times intensify, some of the real political forces at work in
Wisconsin federal judicial selection. The Commission itself is an
institution, developed and implemented by political actors, designed to
bestow legitimacy on a judicial nominating process that is often fiercely
partisan and divisive, qualities that the public generally does not-and
does not want to-associate with the judiciary. 6  On more than one
occasion, these political forces inherent in the advice and consent
process have manifestly affected the nomination process at both the
local and national levels, despite the Commission's involvement.
Moreover, in some of these cases, the use of the Commission itself may
have exacerbated the contentiousness of an already contentious process.
In fact, from the very beginning, the Federal Nominating
Commission faced criticism for its first recommendations to fill two
district court seats in 1979."7 Because the Carter Administration had
created two new federal judgeships in Wisconsin, one for the Eastern
District and one for the Western District," the Senators established one
nominating commission for each district to winnow down the list of
applicants.59
Consistent with President Carter's goal of promoting diversity on the
federal bench, the Western District Commission sent a list of names to
the President that included eventual nominee Barbara Crabb, the first
female federal judge in Wisconsin. 6 By contrast, the Eastern District
Commission faced criticism for providing the President with a list of
names that included no women and only one African-American
candidate.6 In further contravention of the Carter Administration's
55. Stanford, supra note 10.
56. Editorial, Injudicious, WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, at A28 (denouncing "several
attitudes that should be anathema to any federal judge: contempt for judges with whom they
disagree, a vision of the judiciary as essentially political in nature, and a desire to see matters
of national controversy resolved in such a way as to highlight the political differences among
jurists").
57. Editorial, Judicial Selection by Merit Gets So-So Trial, MILW. J., May 18, 1979, pt. 1,
at 1.
58. Id.
59. Youth Emphasized in New Judges, MILW. J., May 19, 1979, pt. 1, at 1.
60. Charles E. Friederich, US Judgeship the Job She Wanted, MILW. J., May 20, 1979, pt.
2, at 12.
61. Walter Fee, All-Male List of Candidates for US Judge Upsets Women, MILW. J., Apr.
24, 1979, pt. 1, at 1.
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goals, the Eastern District Commission included on its final
recommendation list the former treasurer of the Wisconsin State
Democratic Party, a candidate who appeared to make the cut for
political reasons, rather than for merit.62 Although the eventual Eastern
District nominee, Terence Evans, was widely regarded as an eminently
qualified, capable judge,' some observers still felt that the first attempt
at merit-based judicial selection in Wisconsin had not lived up to the
goals that it had been designed to accomplish, as "the list [of finalists
was] not as uniformly excellent as it could have been.' 64
Despite its rocky start, the Wisconsin Federal Nominating
Commission has endured; however, the allegations of undue political
influence in the Commission process have endured as well. The 1981
nomination of John Shabaz to the Western District of Wisconsin, which
ended in a public dispute among members of the Commission who were
divided along party lines, is probably the most dramatic example of the
Commission's failure to remove politics from the judicial selection
process.61 Moreover, two more recent instances-the nomination of
State Senator Lynn Adelman to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin and the nomination of Wisconsin
Supreme Court Justice Diane Sykes to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals-demonstrate the power of both federal and state politics in
federal judicial selection, despite the use of the Commission in both
cases.
A. John Shabaz: Politics Divides the Commission Along Partisan Lines
The nomination of John Shabaz in 1981 was a product of the kind of
partisan political infighting that the Federal Nominating Commission
was developed to counteract. Less than a year into his first term,
President Ronald Reagan, with the urging of Wisconsin Republican
Senator Robert Kasten and over the objections of senior Democratic
Senator William Proxmire, nominated John Shabaz, a Republican state
senator with no prior judicial experience, to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. 66 Despite Reagan's official
62. Walter Fee, Choosing a Judge by the New Rules, MILW. J., June 3, 1979, pt. 2, at 1.
63. Id.
64. Judicial Selection by Merit Gets So-So Trial, supra note 57.
65. See Confirmation Hearing on: Alvin I. Krenzler, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Sam A. Crow,
J. Owen Forrester, Israel Leo Glasser, and John C. Shabaz Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 136-89 (1981) [hereinafter Shabaz Hearing] (statements of Sens.
Robert Kasten and William Proxmire).
66. Id. at 138 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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abolition of the Carter-era federal nominating commissions upon taking
office,67 Wisconsin Senators Proxmire and Kasten continued to use the
bipartisan Nominating Commission to fill this vacancy; however,
according to Senator Kasten, "the merit selection panel in this case did
not work very well." 68
The first signs of discord began during the Commission's secret
voting in April of that year when the Commission-composed of seven
Kasten appointees, three Proxmire appointees, four State Bar of
Wisconsin appointees, and the Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law
School-split along party lines in their consideration of Shabaz, leading
some to suggest that "the Kasten appointees had a prearranged
agreement to vote for Shabaz. ' ,69 The Commission forwarded Shabaz'
name to the Senators and, despite Shabaz' failure to garner a majority
vote of Commission members, Senator Kasten recommended Shabaz to
the President.7° According to the Milwaukee Sentinel, "some of the non-
Kasten appointees were upset with the apparent bloc voting by the
Kasten members" and "believed it violated the spirit of merit
selection."71
These non-Kasten Commission members lodged their objections in a
minority report, prepared by the nonpartisan Wisconsin State Bar
appointees and cosigned by the Proxmire appointees, which was
subsequently leaked and reproduced in the Wisconsin press. This
report described in stark terms the political infighting that took place
behind the scenes of the Shabaz consideration, shielded from public
view by the Commission's own secrecy policy:
The position of this Report is that the integrity of the selection
process was, in this situation, subverted by the concerted action
of seven Commission members, the Kasten appointees, who
succeeded in turning the result of the Commission's designation
into a political spoils system benefiting their pre-selected
candidate, John Shabaz.
67. GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 290-91.
68. Shabaz Hearing, supra note 65, at 137 (statement of Sen. Kasten).
69. Panel Split on U.S. Judgeship, MILW. SENTINEL, May 6, 1981, pt. 1, at 15.
70. Shabaz Hearing, supra note 65, at 137 (statement of Sen. Kasten). According to
Senator Kasten, "panel members could not get a majority vote on more than two candidates.
Therefore, by majority vote they passed a motion forwarding five names with a notation that
three of the candidates received less than a majority vote. Mr. Shabaz was one of the three."
Id.
71. Panel Split on U.S. Judgeship, supra note 69.
72. Shabaz Hearing, supra note 65, at 140 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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In that the tactics and preference of the Shabaz bloc were
determined before the facts ascertained by the Commission's
investigation and interview process were even available, these
members made a farce out of the function of the Commission,
and certainly impugned the integrity of its results. It is the
position of this Report that such actions border on scandal as
being a fraud on the selection process. Objectively, such actions
should negate the nomination of Mr. Shabaz, as the tactics used
to obtain his designation make such designation a sham. Being
apprised of these facts, it should be clear that neither Senator can
in good conscience rely upon the Commission's designation of
Mr. Shabaz.73
Despite the minority report's harsh words regarding the integrity of
the Commission process and over Senator Proxmire's vehement
objections, John Shabaz was nominated and confirmed to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.74 Ironically,
but for the leak of the minority report to the media, the formal Federal
Nominating Commission process would have shrouded with a cloak of
legitimacy what many Commission members perceived as a blatantly
partisan appointment. The lack of transparency and the closed-door
nature of the process may have contributed in this instance to the
majority party's ability to use the Commission as a means to a political
end.
The Commission was not involved in filling the next Wisconsin
vacancy on the federal bench, as President Reagan quickly appointed
then-Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice John L. Coffey to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981, per Senator Kasten's sole
recommendation, while the Shabaz nomination was still pending. 75 At
the time, observers saw this move both as consistent with the Reagan
Administration's abandonment of the Carter-era merit selection panels,
and as a shrewd political calculation on Senator Kasten's part to ensure
an expedited appointment while the Shabaz nomination remained
73. Id. at 164-65 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (quoting the Federal Judicial Nominating
Commission minority report).
74. Shabaz Takes the Bench as New U.S. Judge, MILW. J., January 20, 1982, pt. 1, at 6.
75. Kenneth R. Lamke, Surprising Coffey Selection a Political Plus for Kasten, MILW.
SENTINEL, June 11, 1981, at 5.
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76bogged down in controversy. The Commission process was reinstated
in 1983 with the nomination of Thomas Curran to the Eastern District of
Wisconsin," and has been used to fill every subsequent Wisconsin
vacancy on the federal courts.
B. Lynn Adelman: State Politicians Use a Federal Judicial Appointment
for Political Gain
In 1997, although the Commission process itself was devoid of any
major power struggles similar to those that plagued the Shabaz
nomination, political maneuvering on both the federal and local levels
impacted the nomination of State Senator Lynn S. Adelman to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.78
In addition to maintaining a private legal practice, Lynn Adelman
was a staunch Democrat, long-time state senator, and personal friend of
United States Senator Russ Feingold, with whom he had served in the
state senate." A finalist for a 1995 vacancy on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, Adelman in 1997 once again found his name on the short
list of candidates that the Federal Nominating Commission presented to
the Senators.8°
Adelman, despite his reputation as "one of the true liberals of the
Wisconsin Senate,"81 was nominated and easily confirmed with wide
bipartisan support in the midst of an otherwise contentious, partisan
struggle over federal appointments between Senate Republicans and the
Clinton White House.8' Although it may be tempting to credit the
Federal Nominating Commission for the bipartisan cooperation that
seemed to characterize the Adelman nomination, this ostensible
bipartisanship was instead the result of maneuvering on both sides of
the aisle to use the vacancy to their political advantage after the
Commission's initial screening of the candidates was complete.83
For President Bill Clinton, the Adelman nomination was an attempt
76. Id.
77. Eugene Kane, Judge Makes People His Job, MILW. J., Feb. 7, 1984, at Local 1.
78. Steven Walters & Sam Martino, Both Parties Want Adelman Confirmed, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 1997, at lB.
79. Marchione, supra note 31.
80. Id.
81. Dave Zweifel, Editorial, GOP Gives New Meaning to Cynicism, Spite, CAPITAL
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 19, 1997, at A10.
82. Id.
83. John Nichols, Editorial, Adelman's Judgeship Fraught with Politics, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Nov. 18, 1997, at A8.
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to ingratiate himself with the Wisconsin Democrats, particularly Senator
Feingold, who had "made his former colleague's appointment a personal
priority."' 4  President Clinton, facing a Republican congressional
majority and increasing scrutiny of his public and personal life, likely
saw his support of this nomination as an opportunity to gain much-
needed Democratic allies in the Senate.85
State Republicans, following the lead of then-Governor Tommy
Thompson and aided by the clout of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott,
also threw their support behind Adelman, viewing his appointment to
the federal judiciary as an opportunity to win Adelman's state senate
seat in a Republican-leaning district.8  Gaining control of this seat
would allow the Republicans to claim a one-seat majority in the
Wisconsin Senate.' This dynamic led to an anomalous situation in
which state senate Democrats attempted to stall the nomination of one
of their own in order to preserve their tenuous majority.8
The Republicans' strategy ultimately backfired, however. Shortly
after Judge Adelman's confirmation, the Democrats reclaimed the
majority in the state senate, leaving Wisconsin Republicans to wonder
whether their strategy of endorsing Adelman had been worth giving a
liberal judge life tenure on the federal bench. 9  One state senate
Republican characterized the Adelman strategy as "a huge error, a
tragedy. ... People can be upset that we saw it as a political opportunity.
We did."'  Thus, as the Adelman nomination demonstrates, federal
judicial selection is often fraught with politics, even when the ostensibly
nonpartisan Federal Nominating Commission is involved in the vetting
process.
C. Diane Sykes: Senate Democrats Win the Battle, but Lose the War
Most recently, in 2003, Wisconsin's Senators activated the Federal






89. Associated Press, GOP Regrets Backing Adelman for U.S. Judge, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Dec. 18, 1999, at A3.
90. Id. (quoting state Sen. Alberta Darling, R-River Hills). However, Governor
Thompson's spokesman attempted to play down the consequences of the Adelman strategy,
asserting that Clinton "was going to appoint a big liberal anyway." Id.
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States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.91 Although the
Commission process ran smoothly and without any overt signs of undue
political influence, the initial fight between Wisconsin's Democratic
Senators and the Republican White House over the use of the
Commission had important consequences: The Senators' successful fight
to employ the Commission process resulted in their consequent political
inability to oppose any nominee that the Commission produced.' Thus,
once the Senators' own Nominating Commission produced a list of
names, the Senators found that they lacked the political capital
necessary to strike the names of candidates whom they might have
otherwise opposed, including the eventual nominee, Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice Diane Sykes.
When Judge John Coffey announced his intention to assume senior
status, the George W. Bush White House initially resisted the use of the
Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission to fill the resulting vacancy
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.93 Because federal courts of
appeals seats are particularly influential, the Bush Administration did
not want its selection to be constrained in any way by Wisconsin's two
Democratic Senators: According to a White House spokesman, "The
President makes the decision about who [sic] to select." 9'
Recognizing the high-stakes nature of this appointment, Wisconsin
Senators Kohl and Feingold, both members of the influential Senate
Judiciary Committee, fought to preserve the Nominating Commission.
According to Senator Kohl, "particularly during this time of extreme
contentiousness in the Senate, one could easily argue that the best way
to avoid that here in Wisconsin is to use a commission approach, which
is most likely to produce a nominee both sides can live with."95 Senator
Feingold agreed, stating, "There is no reason to abandon this process,
which is good for the judiciary and for Wisconsin. ' ' 6
Finally, "[a]fter some contentious discussion," ' the White House
agreed to the use of the Federal Nominating Commission, even though
91. Craig Gilbert, U.S. Appeals Judge Cutting Back: Parties Clashing Over Seat, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, May 23, 2003, at lB.
92. Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, Judge Wanted: Young, Female Conservative, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2003, at 2A.
93. Gilbert, supra note 91.
94. Id. (quoting White House spokesman Scott Stanzel).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Gina Barton, 12 Apply to Fill Vacancy on U.S. Appeals Court, MILW. J. SENTINEL,
July 17, 2003, at 7B.
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the President had reportedly prescreened and interviewed six candidates
for the seat before the Commission had even begun accepting
applications." The Commission ultimately returned four names to the
Senators after a deliberative, noncontentious process.9 The Senators,
after initially expending a great deal of political capital fighting for the
use of the Commission, agreed to back any of the four candidates on the
list, including conservative Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Diane
Sykes, the eventual nominee.'O°
At the state level, local politicians saw a potential Sykes
appointment as an opportunity for political gain, as Democratic
Governor Jim Doyle would appoint Justice Sykes's successor to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, presumably affecting the court's ideological
balance.1 1 While many state Democrats hoped that Justice Sykes would
receive the Seventh Circuit appointment for this reason, many state
Republicans did not want to lose a prominent conservative voice on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.'Y2 Moreover, former Wisconsin Governor
Tommy Thompson, a longtime political adversary of Jim Doyle who had
appointed Sykes to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1992, reportedly
was not happy that Governor Doyle would name Justice Sykes's
replacement. °3
Although Diane Sykes's record both as a Wisconsin Supreme Court
justice and as a judge on the Milwaukee County Circuit Court
established her as a results-oriented conservative similar to many
previous Bush judicial nominees that the Senate Democrats had
filibustered that term,"' neither Senator Kohl nor Senator Feingold
98. Spivak & Bice, supra note 52.
99. Callender, supra note 12.
100. David Callender, Kohl, Feingold Back All Four Judge Finalists; Appeals Court Pick
is Up to Bush, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Sept. 18, 2003, at A8.
101. Amy Rinard, It's Official: Sykes Nominated for U.S. Appeals Court, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 2003, at lB.
102. Id.
103. Craig Gilbert, Kohl, Feingold Back Panel's Recommendations for U.S. Appeals
Court, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Sep. 19, 2003, at lB. At the time of the Sykes nomination,
Thompson was serving in the Bush Administration as the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. Governor Doyle served as Wisconsin Attorney General while Thompson was
governor. Callender, supra note 12.
104. Katherine M. Skiba, U.S. Senate Approves Sykes for Federal Seat, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, June 25, 2004, at lB. During Justice Sykes's confirmation hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senators Kohl and Feingold declined to express concern over a
number of instances in Justice Sykes's record that, absent their vigorous support of the
Nominating Commission, they otherwise might have scrutinized more closely. Id. Although
other Democrats on the Committee probed deeper into these problematic areas and were not
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opposed the Sykes nomination, making good on their promise to
support any name on the Commission's final list.' 5 With the Senators'
support, the Sykes nomination was headed for a much smoother and less
controversial confirmation than many previous conservative Bush
nominees.
During the Sykes confirmation hearing, both Democratic Senators
expressed their support for Justice Sykes, but almost more prominently,
expressed their satisfaction with the performance of the bipartisan
Nominating Commission. °6  Senator Kohl stated on the record,
"Wisconsin's process should be a model.., because it finds qualified
applicants and takes much of the politics out of judicial selection."''
Senator Feingold concurred in Senator Kohl's praise for the
Commission process:
Senator Kohl and I have worked very hard to maintain and
strengthen the commission throughout our time in the Senate.
The composition of the commission assures that selections for
these important positions will be made based on merit, not
politics. Over the past 25 years, the commission process has
yielded very high quality nominees and has served to depoliticize
the nomination process in our State. Despite some initial
satisfied with Justice Sykes's explanations, her nomination sailed through the Committee
with the support of both Wisconsin Senators:
The vote Thursday came after harsh criticism on the Senate floor from Democrats
Richard Durbin of Illinois and Pat Leahy of Vermont. Durbin condemned Sykes on
three grounds. First, he said she has taken pride in being known as a "hanging
judge," and he noted that she once told a reporter that a wing of a Wisconsin
maximum-security prison was informally named after her. "Do these sound like
temperate statements by a person who will be asked to honor the presumption of
innocence?" Durbin asked. Second, he charged that Sykes was not "open and
honest" about sentencing two abortion protesters with long arrest records. "You
obviously possess fine characters.... Your motivations are pure," she had said at
sentencing. Third, Durbin charged that Sykes had committed "major-league
evasion" by ducking his questions to her on two landmark Supreme Court cases.
One was the decision to give Miranda rights to suspects; the other ruling legalized
abortion. He said she cited the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct as the reason
she could not answer his questions, but that if all judicial nominees could "hide"
behind such ethics codes, "then the Senate Judiciary Committee should turn out its
lights and the Senate should walk away from any role advising and consenting on
judicial nominees."
Id.
105. Gilbert, supra note 103.
106. Sykes Hearing, supra note 49.
107. Id. at 581-82 (statement of Sen. Kohl).
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resistance, the Bush administration ultimately agreed to have
candidates for the Seventh Circuit vacancy go through the
commission process."
Judging from these statements, combined with the Senators' failure
to ask probing questions during the confirmation hearing, it appears that
winning their initial fight for the Commission tied the Senators' hands
politically, resulting in their acquiescence in the nomination of a
candidate who might not have been acceptable otherwise.' 9 Thus, in
this instance, the use of the Commission led the Senators to consider the
nominee not based on scrutiny of her past record, but instead based on
political considerations, a situation anathema to the very purpose of the
Commission itself.
IV. CONCLUSION: A CAUTIOUS CASE FOR MERIT SELECTION
Because the Constitution delegates the "advice and consent" power
to the United States Senate, the judicial confirmation process has always
been, to some extent, unavoidably political."' According to Professor
Stephen Carter:
The nation moves, and [nominees] very far ahead of it are as
likely to be swept into irrelevance as those very far behind.
Because the politically sensitive President nominates the [judges]
and the politically sensitive Senate must consent to the
nominations, it is no easy matter to argue that the selection
process was designed to be, or can practically be made to be,
entirely distinct from politics. '
Thus, Senators, as members of a political body chosen by
constituents whose votes reflect the political norms of the day, will
inevitably favor judges whose jurisprudence reflects those same norms,
sometimes over those nominees with the most impressive r6sum6s. " '
108. Id. at 582-83 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
109. Spivak & Bice, supra note 92 (describing Senators Kohl and Feingold as "the ones
who went to the wall demanding that the commission be used. 'You're left with, "We'll give
you your conservative, but it's going to cost you,"' said one federal honcho, speculating on the
thought process of the two senators.").
110. Stephen Carter, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: The
Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1189-90 (1988).
111. Id. at 1190.
112. Id.
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Likewise, a commission consisting of members chosen by those same
elected officials will not be completely insulated from political pressures
either. While the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission has
assuaged some of these problems by emphasizing merit, political
pressures still sometimes overshadow the merit-based aspect of the
process, as demonstrated in Part III of this Comment. Nonetheless,
merit-based selection might be an improvement over the current
national rancor surrounding the selection process, as the majority of the
nominations originating from the Nominating Commission-including
those of Lynn Adelman and Diane Sykes-have engendered less
animosity in the Senate than nominees from other states that did not
engage in similar vetting at the local level."3 In an era where very real
political pressures might tempt some Senators to rubberstamp judicial
nominees instead of fulfilling their constitutionally mandated advice and
consent duty,1 14 a return to the "cooling saucer" ideal led by local merit-
selection commissions such as Wisconsin's could be beneficial for both
the Senate and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, less rancor and greater cooperation among political
actors in the judicial nominating process may also protect the legitimacy
of the federal judiciary. Because Article III judges are unelected, enjoy
lifetime tenure, and often make policy-related decisions that impact
people's lives, the legitimacy of the federal judiciary has been precarious
from the start.15 For this reason, the federal courts themselves have
developed a jurisprudence surrounding the Constitution's "case or
controversy" requirement 6 to limit their own power and ensure that the
113. Gregory Stanford, supra note 10.
114. In the 2004 election, a number of Senate Democrats lost reelection amid allegations
of obstructionism, particularly pertaining to judicial nominations. Charles Babington, 109th
Congress Convenes, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at A3. Most prominently, John Thune
unseated Senate Democratic minority leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota in this manner:
Thune, who turns 44 on Friday, said Democrats cannot ignore the successful
Republican campaigns, especially his, in which he portrayed Daschle as the chief
obstructionist of GOP goals.... Alluding to last year's parliamentary tactics by
Senate Democrats that blocked confirmation votes on 10 of President Bush's judicial
nominees, Thune said: "I have to believe that on... judicial nominations, people
who maybe felt in the past obligated to toe the line to sustain a filibuster are now
going to look at it and say we've got to give these nominees an up-or-down vote."
Id.
115. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1986)
(describing "the counter-majoritarian difficulty").
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. According to Justice Tom Clark:
10512005]
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judiciary remains distinctly separate from the other branches of
government, as mandated by the Constitution."' The more heated the
national tug-of-war over judicial nominations, the more it may appear to
the public that the executive and legislative branches view the judiciary
as another political policymaking arm of the government, thus rendering
the unelected judiciary vulnerable to allegations of illegitimacy.
While the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission is not without
its flaws, by rendering the judicial selection process less overtly political
and rancorous, it helps to protect the separateness and thus the
legitimacy of the federal judiciary. Moreover, its focus on merit and
diversity should begin to instill public confidence in the quality and
composition of the federal bench from Wisconsin: Pursuant to the
Nominating Commission Charter, the vetting process focuses heavily on
the respective merits of each candidate that the Commission considers."8
Moreover, the Nominating Commission played a role in the selection of
both the first female and the first African-American federal judges from
Wisconsin, another factor that may increase the legitimacy of the federal
judiciary in the eyes of the public.9
The case or controversy presented must be a genuine dispute... , raising a
substantial question. The Court does not deal in advisory opinions..., moot
questions..., or political issues.... Traditionally it shies away from deciding
constitutional questions; not rendering such a decision unless it is absolutely
necessary to the disposition of the case.... An appeal from the highest state court is
dismissed if that court's judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.... A statute is not construed unless the complaining party shows that he is
substantially injured by its enforcement. An attack on an act of Congress on
constitutional grounds is by-passed in the event a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the constitutional question may be avoided.
Introduction, JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 2 (David M. O'Brien ed.,
2004) (quoting T.C. Clark, Random Thoughts on the Court's Interpretation of Individual
Rights, 1 HOUs. L. REV. 75, 78 (1963)).
117. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton expressed this same concern that the
vitality and legitimacy of the judiciary rests on the maintenance of a strict separation of
powers:
[T~hough individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of
justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter:
I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and
executive. For I agree, -that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
118. Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission Charter, supra note 27, §§ I(b), 111(a).
119. Friederich, supra note 60; Patrick Jasperse, Senate Confirms Clevert as Federal
Judge, MILW. J. SENTINEL, July 18, 1996, at lB. A 1998 report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Judicial Selection pointed out the role of racial and gender diversity on
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Thus, although the Wisconsin Federal Nominating Commission does
not remove all political considerations from federal judicial selection, it
has been a beneficial local tool in restoring some modicum of civility
and legitimacy to the selection process at the national level. If more
Senators fashioned their consideration of federal judicial nominees from
their home states after Wisconsin's merit-selection model, perhaps the
increasingly contentious process could be tamed, marking a return to
the senatorial "cooling saucer" ideal and fortifying the legitimacy of the
federal bench.
ANNIE L. OWENS
the federal bench in enhancing the legitimacy of the judiciary:
The Task Force acknowledges that "representative" considerations have and will at
various times come properly into play in judicial appointments. Geographical
representation on the Supreme Court was important in establishing the legitimacy of
the Court and the national government in the nineteenth century, an era when
sectional loyalty was far greater than it is now. Today, as our population has
become increasingly diverse and opportunities have widened, it has become equally
important that the federal bench be broadly reflective of that diversity.
JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION 6 (1988).
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